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In the Hunterian Art Gallery in Glasgow there is apicture painted in 1894–1895 by James McNeilWhistler entitled “Brown and Gold”. It is also entitled
“Portrait of Lady Eden”. But you cannot see Lady Eden’s
features. This picture was the subject of one of the early
French privacy cases: Eden c/Whistler, Cass Civ, 14 mars
1900 (arret de rejet), D 1900I497 note Planiol. In that case
it was established that the artist could be restrained from
exhibiting the sitter’s image without her consent. There
had been a dispute about payment, and Whistler refused to
deliver the portrait. The Edens failed in their attempt to
obtain delivery up of the portrait. But Whistler was
restrained from making any use of the picture, public or
private, or letting it look like Lady Eden.
In art galleries throughout Europe there are pictures of
prominent men surrounded by their families, often royal
families. I have particularly in mind a family portrait of
King George III, Queen Charlotte and their children
painted in 1770. This is an image of a royal family in a style
typical the 18th century. The King stands above the Queen,
who is seated surrounded by children. The emphasis is on
the power of the throne and the security of the succession.
But in a few years George III had lost his American
subjects, and the succession was not secure. By the early
the 19th century most of the European monarchs had lost
their thrones.
A different image of monarchy emerged. It is
represented in the picture by Edwin Landseer “Windsor
Castle in Modern Times”, which hangs in the Royal
Collection.
At the time of the accession of Victoria to the throne,
and for much of her reign, republicanism had strong
support in England, and the prospects for the survival of
the monarchy remained uncertain. Queen Victoria
projected an image of herself which was more consistent
with the increasingly democratic spirit of the times. This is
an intimate portrait of private life. The style would be
acceptable to Hello! magazine. The emphasis is on
intimacy and luxury.
Engravings of this picture were published in 1851. Prince
Albert v Strange (1849) 1 H & TW 1, 1302 was decided in
1848. In that case the Prince was seeking to prevent
exploitation by a private publisher of illegally obtained
copies of drawings that he and the Queen had made of
each other, of their children and of the family pets. Would
an application to discharge the injunction have succeeded
once the engravings of Landseer’s picture had been
published? Or in the words of the government that I shall
quote again: could it be said that the Queen and Prince
Albert (or George III and Queen Charlotte) had invaded
their own privacy? That might make a subject for a moot.
These cases illustrate a point. It is the rich and famous
who are likely to bring cases in which the common law (or
French judge made law) develops. Ordinary people will not
normally be able to afford the risk, at least in an age where
there is little access to public funding. There is nothing
unusual about this. The rich and powerful are responsible
for much of the reported case law in the law of contract
and other fields of the law. It is the deep pockets of news
publishers and broadcasters that have paid for most of the
cases in which the public’s right of freedom of expression
has been established.
The royal pictures illustrate a second point. The
protection of the privacy of people in public life has a
constitutional dimension. It may not be in the public
interest that a monarch or politician who permits any
photograph of his or her family to be published should
then be said to have waived or forfeited the right to privacy.
If, as a result, such people permit no pictures of their
families, the public may, as a result, be less well informed,
and their right to receive information be interfered with.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Department of Culture, Media and Sport has
published its reply to the Select Committee’s Fifth Report
on Privacy and Media Intrusion ((HC 458) para 111 and Cm
5985 the Government’s response to the Fifth Report of
the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, on
Privacy and Media Intrusion (TSO Ref HC 458–1),
published on 16 June 2003, para 23). The Committee
recommended that the Government bring forward
legislative proposals to clarify the protection that
Privacy and celebrity:
an update
by The Honourable Mr Justice Tugendhat
The author considers new developments in a topic that was the
subject of a previous two-part article in Amicus Curiae.
A
rticle
individuals can expect from unwarranted intrusion by
anyone – not the press alone – into their private lives. This,
the Committee said, is necessary fully to satisfy the
obligations upon the UK under the European Convention
of Human Rights.
This is the Government’s response:
“The debate over whether to introduce specific privacy
legislation is a legitimate one. There are several reasons,
however, why we believe more legislation is not only
unnecessary but undesirable. We need to ask what would be
the purpose and benefits of such legislation. First of all,
various aspects of privacy are already protected by legislation –
for example, the Data Protection Act – and there is the over-
arching impact of the 1998 Human Rights Act’s (HRA)
provisions on the right to respect for private life. However,
Section 12 of the HRA makes provision for substantial
protection for the historic right to free speech, and there is a
balance to be struck between freedom of expression and the
right to privacy. We believe that that balance is not always to
be found at the same point because, in effect, some people can
be said to have invaded their own privacy by, for example,
granting access to photographers, and thereby making public
details of their private lives. The weighing of competing rights
in individual cases is the quintessential task of the courts, not
of Government, or Parliament. Parliament should only
intervene if there are signs that the courts are systematically
striking the wrong balance; we believe there are no such
signs”.
Not everyone was surprised by this response. Where
does it leave us?
Exactly four months later the House of Lords gave its
decision in Wainwright v The Home Office [2003] UKHL 53.
The Wainwrights’ case had nothing to do with the press or
the disclosure of information, and has not altered the law
on that topic. The case was about the strip searching of two
people visiting a prison. Significantly, the events in question
were in 1996. Lord Hoffmann’s words echo those of the
Government. He said:
“There are a number of common law and statutory remedies
of which it may be said that one at least of the underlying
values they protect is a right of privacy. Sir Brian Neill’s well
known article ‘Privacy: a challenge for the next century’ in
Protecting Privacy (ed B Markesinis, 1999) contains a
survey. Common law torts include trespass, nuisance,
defamation and malicious falsehood; there is the equitable
action for breach of confidence and statutory remedies under
the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Data
Protection Act 1998. There are also extra-legal remedies
under Codes of Practice applicable to broadcasters and
newspapers. But there are gaps; cases in which the courts have
considered that an invasion of privacy deserves a remedy which
the existing law does not offer. Sometimes the perceived gap
can be filled by judicious development of an existing principle.
The law of breach of confidence has in recent years undergone
such a process: see in particular the judgment of Lord Phillips
of Worth Matravers MR in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003]
QB 633. On the other hand, an attempt to create a tort of
telephone harassment by a radical change in the basis of the
action for private nuisance in Khorasandjian v Bush
[1993] QB 727 was held by the House of Lords in Hunter
v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655 to be a step too far.
The gap was filled by the 1997 Act.”
The House of Lords did not perceive any gap in the law
which they considered needed to be filled to create a
remedy for the distress suffered by the Wainwrights. It was
held to be significant that their claim to privacy was based
on distress alone, without other damage. There was of
course a remedy for the unlawful touching in the claim in
trespass.
Clearly Lord Hoffmann was not excluding any future
filling of other perceived gaps by judicious development of
existing principle. But his message was mixed. He
recommended reading of Sir Robert Megarry V-C’s
judgment in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979]
Ch 344, 372-81. He endorsed the statement (at [20]):
“It seems to me that where Parliament has abstained from
legislating on a point that is plainly suitable for legislation, it
is indeed difficult for the court to lay down new rules of
common law or equity that will carry out the Crown’s treaty
obligations, or to discover for the first time that such rules
have always existed”.
To illustrate the course Sir Robert had recommended,
Lord Hoffman referred to the remedy subsequently
provided by Parliament in the form of the Interception of
Communications Act 1985. Similarly, Lord Hoffmann
noted that the absence of a tort of intentional harassment
had been remedied by Parliament in the Protection from
Harassment Act 1997. Lord Hoffmann also doubted
whether that Act would have provided a remedy for the
Wainwright’s complaint, even if it had been in force,
because (in s1(1)) it defines harassment as a “course of
conduct”. On that basis there might be a perceived gap in
the law for harassment consisting of what he called ‘one
boorish incident’.
However, Lord Hoffmann did not rule out development
of the common law. On the contrary, he said “any
development of the common law should show similar
caution”, that is to say, caution similar to that shown by
Parliament in its limited definition of harassment. He did
not say that because Parliament had spoken, no
development of the common law could occur at all.
Although the events in question had occurred in 1996,
Lord Hoffmann made some observations about the post
Human Rights Act world. He said (at [34]):
“…the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998
weakens the argument for saying that a general tort of
invasion of privacy is needed to fill gaps in the existing
remedies. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act are in themselves
substantial gap fillers; if it is indeed the case that a person’s18
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rights under article 8 have been infringed by a public
authority, he will have a statutory remedy”.
The reference to Malone and to the remedy subsequently
provided by Parliament in the form of the Interception of
Communications Act 1985 is a reminder of both the
strengths and the limitations of reliance on Parliament to
provide effective remedies required by the ECHR.
As is well known, the Interception of Communications
Act 1985 did not in fact succeed fully in its legislative
purpose. It was drafted to address interception of
communications in public telecommunications systems. It
failed to address interception on systems outside the public
network. As a result the UK lost yet another case in
Strasbourg: Halford v UK (1997) 24 EHRR. The upshot was
that new legislation was required in the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Whether that Act has
covered all the requirements of ECHR Article 8 in this field
remains to be seen.
Protection of privacy is an area of the law which
undoubtedly benefits from the procedures available to the
legislature, which are not available to the courts. There is
opportunity for full consultation with interested parties.
There can be debate in Parliament. There is opportunity
for the harmonisation of our law with that of other
countries.
But it does not follow from this, that development of the
common law should be arrested. As the President said (at
[100]) in Venables v NGN:
“Although the dictum of Lord Eldon in Iveson’s case 7 Ves
251 (‘you cannot have an injunction except against a party
to the suit’) has been generally followed for nearly 200 years,
in light of the implementation of the Human Rights Act
1998, we are entering a new era, and the requirement that
the courts act in a way that is compatible with the
Convention, and have regard to European jurisprudence, adds
a new dimension to those principles. I am satisfied that the
injunctive relief that I grant should, in this case, be granted
openly against the world.”
The Court of Appeal has returned to the point this year,
in a case concerned with the court’s inherent jurisdiction
to protect children. Since the case did not involve a claim
in confidentiality, various newspaper groups made a
submission to the effect that they were not public
authorities, and so that they were not bound by Article 8.
It was argued that the court can only strike a balance
between the countervailing rights of individuals under
Articles 8 and of the media under Article 10 in an action
for breach of confidence. Hale LJ rejected this in Re S (A
Child) [2003] EWCA Civ 963, [47]–[48] saying:
“That cannot be right. An action for breach of confidence
cannot be the only context in which the courts have to strike a
fair balance between the rights of individuals under Article 8
and Article 10. While the courts cannot invent a new cause of
action between private persons, the same issues arise whenever
it has jurisdiction to restrain publication. If anything, the
current context is stronger than the purely private law context
of an action for breach of confidence (such as arose in
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1373; [2003]
2 WLR 80)”.
It is to be wondered whether a development of the
common law which might have met Ms Halford’s
complaint would have appeared impossible in 1996, as it
plainly did, if at that time the modern approach had been
available to the courts before the implementation of the
HRA. As the Government and Lord Hoffmann have both
pointed out, there are other statutes in this field. So far as
publication of information is concerned, there is the data
protection legislation (Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ
1995 L 281, p. 31), and the Data Protection Act 1998).
The courts have been cautious in applying the DP
legislation outside the field of databases such as the
electoral register or the files of credit reference agencies.
There have been a number of cases in which the legislation
has been held to be applicable outside that sphere, but in
none of them has it affected the result materially: see
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1373 [72–138],
Ellis v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2003] EWHC 1321
(Admin) [29] and Douglas v Hello!, both in the Court of
Appeal and in the judgments on liability and damages of
Lindsay J [2003] EWHC 786 [230]–[239].
This legislation now merits further attention for a
number of reasons. But it is first of all to be noted, that like
the Interception of Communications Act 1985, the DP
legislation illustrates the continuing need for the
development of the common law.
The reason for this is that the DP legislation is so drafted
as to bite only upon information recorded in a particular
form: effectively on a computer. Now the major
development in the common law in relation to privacy was
made in a case which had nothing to do with computers.
In Venables v NGN [2001] 2 WLR 1038, para 81, the
President first broke the link between the law of
confidentiality and any pre-existing relationship. This was
inspired by the reasoning of Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello!,
which is referred to by Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright. But
whereas Sedley LJ had merely expressed views on the
occasion of an interim application, the President had to
make a final injunction. It has never, to my knowledge,
been questioned that she was right both in that case, and in
the very similar case of Mary Bell and her daughter decided
in April 2000 (X and Y v NGN [2003] EWHC QB 1101).
This judicious development of the common law was also
confirmed in A v B [11(ix)] where Lord Woolf CJ said :
“A duty of confidence will arise whenever the party subject to
the duty is in a situation where he either knows or ought to
know that the other person can reasonably expect his privacy 19
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to be protected. (See Lord Goff of Chieveley, in Attorney
General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [No. 2] [1990] 1
AC 109 at 281.)”
Although those cases were expressly stated to have been
decided under the law of confidentiality, that word is used
in its legal and not in any ordinary sense. The injunction in
Venables would apply to information obtained in a public
street, where no question of confidentiality could arise.
Suppose that at some time Venables were to find himself,
by co-incidence, living opposite an old neighbour. Suppose
the old neighbour of Venables happened to recognise
Venables in the street. There could be no question of a
breach of confidence in the ordinary sense of that word, if
the neighbour were to report what he had seen to the
public. But the President’s injunction would clearly be
effective to stop the neighbour from publicising what he
had discovered of the present whereabouts of Venables.
The need for protection of Venables’ identity is
something which is not related to modern means of
communication. The DP legislation would undoubtedly
bite on any internet based communication in Europe, and
on any communication by a newspaper produced using the
electronic techniques by which almost all modern
newspapers are produced. But there are other ways in
which individuals can be identified by and to large numbers
of people. The identities, and present whereabouts, of
paedophiles, or suspected paedophiles, sometimes need
protecting. In those cases we have all seen pictures of
crowds gathering carrying placards. The present name and
address of Venables, or of Mary Bell, or of a suspected
paedophile, could be put on a placard and carried round a
town without the need of any technique that would bring
the DP legislation into play.
The Venables line of decisions thus shows clearly the need
for continued judicious development of the common law.
They also show what a stimulant the HRA has been to such
development. It is to be wondered whether the President
would have felt able to make the development of the law
that she did make (explicitly by reference to convention
rights), but for the Act and Sedley LJ’s comments upon its
effect. It is to be wondered what Sir Robert Megarry would
have done if Malone had been seeking an injunction to
prevent disclosure of his name in circumstances where
(perhaps as a police informer) his life would have been
endangered by the disclosure.
The Court of Appeal has followed the President’s lead in
developing the common law under the inspiration of the
Human Rights Act. I have already mentioned Re S (A Child)
[2003] EWCA Civ 963. In D v L [2003] EWCA Civ 1169
[19]–[20] the Court of Appeal held that:
“As long ago as 1913 in Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch
469 475 Swinfen Eady LJ said: ‘The principle upon which
the Court of Chancery has acted for many years has been to
restrain the publication of information improperly or
surreptitiously obtained or of information imparted in
confidence which ought not to be divulged’ Thus either
surreptitious behaviour or breach of a confidential relationship
can give rise to a duty of confidence which would be protected
by the court… An obligation of confidence can be imposed by
conduct. If a person takes a photograph in a private place,
knowing that he or she is not allowed to do so, then subject
to certain public policy justifications, an obligation not to
publish that photograph will be imposed” .
In both those cases, in Re S(A Child), and D v L, although
the courts found a basis for granting an injunction,
nevertheless, in each case the court declined in fact to grant
the injunction. This followed, because the courts had
regard to freedom of expression and Article 10. The fact
that the court holds that it has power to protect privacy
does not mean that it will automatically do so.
Those cases also illustrate the need for the continuing
development of the common law. No doubt on the facts of
each, a substantial degree of protection might in principle
have been obtainable under the DP legislation. But the
protection would not have been complete. D v L was
decided as an application of the principle in Lord Ashburton
v Pape. Lord Ashburton’s case was decided long before
computers, and the surreptitious means used to obtain
information in his case, by removal of a piece, or pieces, of
paper is as much a possibility now as it was then.
Nevertheless there are solid reasons for paying more
attention to the DP legislation. These have now been
emphasised in the judgment European Court of Justice on
6 November 2003 in Case C-101/01, a reference to
Luxembourg on a prosecution of a Mrs Lindqvist. The facts
of the case have a certain charm:
“In addition to her job as a maintenance worker, Mrs
Lindqvist worked as a catechist in the parish of Alseda
(Sweden). She followed a data processing course on which she
had inter alia to set up a home page on the internet. At the
end of 1998, Mrs Lindqvist set up internet pages at home on
her personal computer in order to allow parishioners preparing
for their confirmation to obtain information they might need.
At her request, the administrator of the Swedish Church’s
website set up a link between those pages and that site.
The pages in question contained information about Mrs
Lindqvist and 18 colleagues in the parish, sometimes
including their full names and in other cases only their first
names. Mrs Lindqvist also described, in a mildly humorous
manner, the jobs held by her colleagues and their hobbies. In
many cases family circumstances and telephone numbers and
other matters were mentioned. She also stated that one
colleague had injured her foot and was on half-time on
medical grounds.
“Mrs Lindqvist had not informed her colleagues of the
existence of those pages or obtained their consent, nor did she
notify the [Swedish equivalent of the Information
Commissioner] of her activity. She removed the pages in20
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question as soon as she became aware that they were not
appreciated by some of her colleagues”.
Some may recall the observations of Lord Denning MR
in Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] Ch 401 on the impact of the
Treaty of Rome on English law, which he made just after
the passing of the European Communities Act 1972. He
said (at 418):
“The first and fundamental point is that the Treaty concerns
only those matters which have a European element, that is to
say, matters which affect people or property in the nine
countries of the common market besides ourselves. The Treaty
does not touch any of the matters which concern solely
England and the people in it. These are still governed by
English law. They are not affected by the Treaty. But when we
come to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like
an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the
rivers.”
One of the questions raised in the reference to the ECJ
was whether Mrs Linqvist’s activities fell within or outside
the scope of Community law. The answer is that they did
fall within the scope of Community law. Could Lord
Denning ever have supposed that the incoming tide would
go so far as to flood the village church? Once it had been
decided that the activities did fall within the scope of
Community Law, it was inevitable that it would also be held
that the information about the injured foot and the person
on part time work on medical grounds would be held to
constitute sensitive personal data.
The important question in the case was whether the
provisions of the Directive, which implement Article 8 of
the ECHR, bring about a restriction which conflicts with
the general principles of freedom of expression or other
freedoms and rights, which are are enshrined in, inter alia,
Article 10 of the ECHR.
This was a question that had troubled the media when
the Data Protection Bill was being debated in Parliament.
The result of the intervention of the media was the late
inclusion in the Bill of what became section 32 of the 1998
Act, the so-called media exemption.
The answer to this question, given by the ECJ, was that
“…the provisions of Directive 95/46 do not, in themselves,
bring about a restriction which conflicts with the general
principles of freedom of expression or other freedoms and
rights, which are applicable within the European Union and
are enshrined inter alia in Article 10 of the ECHR. It is for
the national authorities and courts responsible for applying
the national legislation implementing Directive 95/46 to
ensure a fair balance between the rights and interests in
question, including the fundamental rights protected by the
Community legal order” (Case C-101/01 [90]).
The ECJ emphasised that any sanction for an
interference with private life must respect the principle of
proportionality. One can only wonder at what sanction
would be small enough to be proportionate to Mrs
Lidqvist’s breach of the law.
This outcome is encouraging. It is encouraging to the
media, because it makes clear that they do not need to rely
only on section 32 of the DPA 1998 for protection of their
right of freedom of expression. It is encouraging for the
rest of us, because only the media are protected by section
32, and it would be unfortunate if no one else’s right of
freedom of expression were respected.
The Lindqvist case also seems to me to be encouraging
for judges. It means that if the Directive applies to a case
at all (and it almost always will apply to a case involving the
media), then it may no longer be necessary to decide what
is, or is not, a permissible development of the common
law. Such difficult terrain will need to be crossed only in
cases such as Venables where relief under the DP legislation
would not suffice.
Where does that leave celebrities? The important cases
in which the common law has developed are cases where
lives, and health and well being of ordinary people were at
risk: Venables, Mary Bell, the child in Re S – ordinary
people in the sense of people from ordinary backgrounds
who did not seek celebrity, or use celebrity to earn their
livings. While in one sense Venables and Mary Bell and her
daughter are celebrities, they are untypical celebrities.
They were seeking anonymity. They truly want to be let
alone. For them the DP legislation is, as I have shown,
inadequate. Their identities were always at risk of being
disclosed by a fanatic with a placard.
The celebrities who do seek control over the disclosure
of information about them, whether in image or written
form, will receive all the protection that they need. If the
court is asked to approach the matter through the DP
legislation, it will not be necessary to decide whether an
image recorded in Brentwood High Street was
confidential. It will be recalled that Mr Peck’s image
recorded there in 1994 did not enjoy the protection of the
1995 Directive and the 1998 Act.
It will not be necessary to introduce from the USA, or
Australia, concepts not previously found in English law, in
particular the concept of offensiveness. It will not be
necessary to reconsider the introduction from America of
the “public figure”, whose recognition was rejected in
England in relation to libel As Sir David Eadyhas said (in a
speech at a seminar in Gray’s Inn on 12 December 2002
to celebrate the publication of Privacy and the media, eds
Tugendhat and Christie OUP, 2002):
“I very much take the view that individual citizens should not
be separated out into different classes when it comes to the
application of the law.”
The attempt to persuade the House of Lords to adopt
the American public figure defence had failed in Reynolds v
Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127. The fact that the DP
legislation is part of Community Law reduces the scope for 21
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appeals to the Court of Appeal. There is no appeal from a
judgment of the ECJ. The law as stated in Mrs Lindqvist’s
case is not just something to which the English courts must
have regard under HRA section 2. It has the binding force
of Community Law.
The fact that the DP legislation is part of Community
Law removes the need for the courts to enquire whether,
and to what extent, Article 8 has horizontal effect. The
Directive enacts that it does. The DP Act 1988 also
addresses the point on which the Wainwrights failed in the
House of Lord. Where there is a breach of the Act which
causes no more than distress, the claimant is entitled to
compensation against a media defendant, although against
any other defendant he will have to prove that he has also
suffered damage.
Reliance on the DP legislation means that it will not
even be necessary to talk of a law of privacy at all. The word
privacy has such negative connotations to some, that any
endorsement of it by the courts would attract public
controversy. The real issues in so-called privacy cases are
generally ones of freedom of expression. Article 10 of
ECHR gives a clear and flexible basis for deciding whether
or not information can or cannot be published. So long as
the Courts address those issues as they did in Re S (A Child)
and D v L, there should be nothing to fear. A finding of a
right to protect personal information does not
automatically lead to the imposition of an injunction or an
award of damages.
In addition, there is a body of Strasbourg law which has
explored the different types of speech and the degree of
protection that they attract. The cases are well known.
Of course, it may turn out that in cases brought under
the DP legislation the courts cannot provide an effective
remedy in cases where they considers there should be a
remedy. If the common law cannot be developed to fill the
gap in such cases, then at least it will be clear where the
legislature should be invited to intervene. The government
and the House of Lords should be taken at their words, and
the existing remedies tested.
I will conclude with a final reminder of a beautiful dark
haired celebrity who has contributed more than anyone to
the development of the law of privacy. Her name will
forever be associated with it.
Caroline – formerly Princess of Monaco, now of
Hanover – will soon obtain another decision on Article 8
from Strasbourg. If she succeeds, ordinary people may
have reason to be grateful that she has been prepared to pay
for the development of the law, and if she loses so too will
the media. Adam Smith’s invisible hand works at the
common law.
• This article is based on a lecture given at the Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies on 24 November 2003.
Michael Tugendhat’s previous two-part article appeared
in issues 37 and 38 of Amicus Curiae in 2001.
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